

# VeriOSS: using the Blockchain to Foster Bug Bounty Programs

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# The problem

- Open source software (OSS) is ubiquitous
  - Web browsers
  - Operating Systems
  - Libraries
- Many security-critical utilities
  - OpenSSL, KeePass, GnuPG, ...
- Vulnerabilities in OSS may spread out to many systems
  - Also closed source and proprietary software
- Security analysts can inspect the code
  - But vulnerability detection is hard and requires workforce and money


# Bug bounty

- Bounty issuers offer rewards for each bug found
  - Rewards depend on type and impact
- Bounty hunters report their bugs and apply for a bounty
  - E.g., they disclose a vulnerability by filling a report
- Hunters can federate in large organizations of ethical hackers
  - E.g., **HackeOne**
- For OSS, bug bounties can be offered by third parties
  - E.g., public institutions (see **EU-FOSSA** and **EU-FOSSA 2**)

# Market performance


- Two markets: bug bounties vs. 0-day exploits
  - 0-day exploits can be sold on gray/black markets
  - E.g., zerodium
- If a bug can be turned into an exploit, the value increases significantly
  - **Google Chrome: from 5000\$ to 300000\$**
  - source: <https://tinyurl.com/vlroo69>
- Many bounty issuers also require an **evidence** of the bug
  - Typically an exploit
- Bug reporting requires extra effort
  - E.g., providing a remediation plan
- Bug eligibility is decided by the bounty issuer **after** disclosure
  - Limited bargaining power for the bounty hunter

# VeriOSS



# Bounty claim protocol

- On chain (BC), fair exchange protocol between issuer (BI) and hunter (BH)
  - Pay-per-Knowledge (P2K)
- BH initially claims to know an execution trace hitting a bug and makes a commitment
- BI checks the bug eligibility but cannot reproduce the trace



# Challenge-response

- The loop in the bounty claim protocol is a **proof-of-knowledge** (PoK)
  - BH proves she knows the next segment of the execution trace
- BI publishes a smart contract with a **challenge**
  - The contract pays its balance to BH only if she can solve the challenge
- The challenge is a NP-hard problem if BH does not know the trace
  - E.g., providing a model for a satisfiable SMT formula
- **Backward symbolic execution** can support it!
  - BI and BH run a remote, backward, symbolic debug session

# Conclusion and future work

- VeriOSS aim to support a fair, reliable and open market for bug bounty programs
- Solidity contracts are under development

## NEXT STEPS

- Equilibria for partial rewards
- Alternative challenge-response implementations
- Formal verification of the protocols



Thank you

# Extra: Implementation

- Challenge takes a state as a byte vector
  - Decommits and solve the challenge
  - Transfer in case of success
- Solve returns true only if the provided state is a valid model for the symbolic constraints
- Decommit checks the state hash
- BI can revoke the contract after a while

```
1  contract PartialReward {
2
3      address public hunter = /* ... */;
4      uint     public reward = /* ... */;
5      uint     public expire = /* ... */;
6
7      function challenge(bytes4[] state) public {
8          if(decommit(state) && solve(state))
9              hunter.transfer(reward);
10     }
11
12     function solve(bytes4[] state) private
13     returns (bool)
14     {
15         if(state[0] <= 255) // not (a > 255)
16             return false;
17         return true;
18     }
19
20     function decommit(bytes4[] state) private
21     returns (bool) { /* check state hash */ }
22
23     function timeout() public {
24         require(now >= expire);
25         selfdestruct(this);
26     }
27 }
```